WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT LAW?

INACTIVE MAJORITY
We should not discount the possibility that the majority of shareholders are inactive not because they are unable to attend or find it difficult to participate meaningfully in general meetings, but because our culture is such that they are only interested in financial returns at the end of the day. In response to the consultation paper, we would firstly argue that annual general meetings should be retained. Secondly, we feel that many of the ideas put forward in the paper will only remove practical and procedural difficulties; they will also do little to obligate the larger o o shareholders to take a more active role at general meetings, as should be the case. We will look briefly at the law and practice in the US in relation to 'shareholder activism' to consider if we could adopt some of its more useful features in the attempt to reform annual general meetings in this country.
SHOULD THE AGM BE ABOLISHED?
Should annual general meetings be abolished? We believe not. Annual general meetings are part of UK company culture and tradition. We believe that their abolition will promote more apathy amongst shareholders than already exists.
It is necessary to retain annual general meetings (albeit in an amended form) as a focal point for shareholders to remove the AGM altogether would remove the o sense of identity7 shareholders have as shareholders of a particular company. Instead, we should eliminate the factors that stand in the way of annual general meetings being effective, so as to enable shareholders to exercise optimum influence at these meetings.
TRAINING REQUIREMENT
Institutional shareholders in this country have as a priority profit maximisation for their own clients.
Thev seldom concern themselves with affairs in their portfolio company, unless, perhaps, if and when its underperformance threatens the value of their shareholding. By then, it is too We commend the many ideas that the consultation paper has put forward in terms of reforming the annual general meeting. However, we feel that some of the ideas are simplistic (such as holding AGMs at unlimited number of locations, provision of audio-visual communication, communication through electronic means, inclusion of compulsory matters on the AGM agenda and changing the minimum notice period); they will merely remove the practical difficulties shareholders currently experience rather than address the real problem that of apathy and de-motivation. We should not discount the possibility that the majority of shareholders are inactive not because they are unable to attend or find it difficult to participate meaningfully in general meetings, but because our culture is such that they are only interested in financial returns at the end of the day. 
Obligation to participate
How then do we ensure that shareholders make full use of the annual general meeting to ensure good corporate governance? We feel the following points are crucial. with affairs in their portfolio company, unless, perhaps, if and when its underperformance threatens the value of their shareholding. By then, it is too late.
Training institutional investors and their fund managers on matters of corporate governance should be a requirement under the law, not an option. The law can make better use of existing and able (in terms of resource and influence) shareholders to curb mismanagement.
OPPORTUNITY
Annual general meetings ... provide an opportunity for shareholders to meet together to liaise with management in relation to the affairs of the company-Collective decisions as to the future of the company are taken. Annual general meetings are a vital part of the corporate disclosure process that helps to inform and protect shareholder rights ...
Relaxation of rules for tabling shareholder resolutions
Secondly, we would argue that the stringent requirements in relation to tabling shareholder resolutions must be o made more 'shareholder-friendly' so that smaller but no less interested shareholders can play a more active part in corporate governance. We note that the system in the US allows even individual shareholders to (although we recognise that this route may import into the process problems of delay and unnecessary bureaucracy).
DEEP-ROOTED BELIEF
We need to move away from the deeprooted belief that individual shareholders can do very little to change the way their companies are run and encourage a more 'interventionist' attitude amongst smaller shareholders.
More importantly, however, attitudes in this country amongst smaller shareholders must change. Along with opening up the way for them to get involved more freely, they must he reeducated, urged to participate in annual general meetings and recognise the potential they have, even as individual shareholders. We need to move away from the deep-rooted helief that individual shareholders can do very little to change the way their companies are run and encourage a more 
Mini-meetings
Thirdly, there is much to recommend holding a series of 'mini' AGMs to supplement one monolithic annual general meeting. These meetings could be timed to coincide with the announcement of interim and final results of the company in question. At these company fora, the chairman, executive and non-executive directors report in person to the meeting on the results and take questions there and then from individual and institutional company shareholders, their analysts and proxies on the results and other aspects of board policy (including aspects of board renumeration, strategy, etc. 
THE US POSITION
Shareholder resolutions are an integral part of company life in the US. Indeed shareholder activism as a whole charts an interesting path in its corporate history. Corporations in the US are primarily a creation of state law. The federal role is primarily to ensure that there is access for shareholders to information about publiclv-traded corporations through the regulatorv oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Shareholder resolutions are circulated at the company's expense, provided the proposer owns at least 1 per cent or $2,000 of shares entitled to be voted and has held these shares for at least a vear.
The requirement as to the volume of shareholding is much less onerous than in the UK. These resolutions may be tabled to address dissatisfaction with directors' performance or their remuneration, and may even advocate social responsibility on the part of the company (for example, challenging the company on its human rights, fair trade or environmental policies). Of course, the company may challenge the resolution by sending it to the SEC, who may exclude it on one of several grounds. On the whole, however, these resolutions have been boldly used to put shareholders' views across to directors and activity in this area appears to be growing. According to the Report of the Sub Council on Competitiveness USA (J Charkham, at 231: It is tempting to perceive the US model of shareholder activism as one which has evolved further than its British counterpart. Concentrated ownership power in the hands of institutional investors can be a force for constructive tendencies (see I Millstein, 'The Evolution of the certifying Board', The Business Lawyer, August 1993, Vol 48(4)).
It has been commented that the US system enables shareholders to affect governance outcomes in a variety of ways O J J and such shareholder power (in particular giving broad access to the courts) is uniquely 'US-made'. The fact that such powers are now increasinglyaccruing to institutional investors in the UK cannot be ignored and the developments in the US should not go unnoticed in this country.
US institutional shareholders (specifically private sector pension funds) are also obliged to vote their shares or at least see that their fund managers do so. The votes must be cast in the interest of the beneficiaries, but, put simply, institutional shareholders in the UK do not pull their weight and seldom get involved so as to ensure good corporate governance in their portfolio companies. The US Department of Eabour, however, is committed to ensuring that trustees of private sector pension funds cast their votes on behalf of their beneficiaries and has gone so far as to establish a programme to ensure that this is observed: 
US PROGRAMME
The US Department of Labour ... is committed to ensuring that trustees of private sector pension funds cast their votes on behalf of their beneficiaries and has gone so far as to establish a o programme to ensure that this is observed.
As these institutional shareholders have an obligation to cast their votes in the US, there is much more that thev must do before they arc able to cast their votes on behalf of their beneficiaries. This will at least include questioning management on specific policies, requiring information from management and participating in general meetings. Although it is important to point out that the above-mentioned policy only affects a selected type of institutional shareholder in the US, there is no reason why the UK cannot adopt and apply the same policy more universally in this country.
CONCLUSION
We think it essential that some form of annual general meeting (or however such a meeting is termed) be retained as a local point lor company/shareholder dialogue. We also recognise there is a need to get rid of outdated and illogical rules which block openness and transparency on the part of companies vis-a-vis their shareholders, and for the law to regulate more stringently the voting responsibilities of institutional shareholders.
Most importantly, we need to drive shareholder activism forward so as to benefit both the company and the interests it affects in the wider community. Adopting the willingness of the law in the US to allow small shareholders to table resolutions, at the company's expense, to address what they perceive as important in their companies is one of many ways we can achieve this goal. Only if smaller shareholders are confident that their actions and efforts have as valid a role in corporate governance as those of larger shareholders (and there are signs of this in the US) will they begin to emerge from the woodwork. 
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